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Germany's Online Gambling Regulation: Five Years of Strict Rules, a Growing Black Market and a Warning for Denmark

Germany licensed online casino in 2021 with a €1 stake limit, a tax on every stake and a ban on affiliate revenue share. Five years later, up to half the market may be unlicensed. Denmark, which opened in 2012 with lean rules and reached 90% channelisation, is now copying parts of the German model with L 37.

23 min readUpdated 15 November 2026
Germany's Online Gambling Regulation: Five Years of Strict Rules, a Growing Black Market and a Warning for Denmark

Germany is one of the largest gambling markets in Europe, and in July 2021 it finally gave online casino a legal footing. Five years later, the result is one of the most restrictive licensed markets in the world: a stake limit of €1 per spin, a five-second minimum between spins, a €1,000 monthly deposit cap shared across every operator, no online roulette or blackjack under the national licence, and a tax on stakes rather than on revenue that forces licensed slots to pay out less than the competition. The competition, in this case, is the black market.

How big that black market is depends on who you ask. The regulator's own commissioned study says around a quarter of online gambling revenue goes to unlicensed operators. A study commissioned by the German sports broadcaster Sport1 says it is more than half, and 70 to 80% for online slots and casino. A German tax court has worked on the assumption that it is 80%. Nobody serious argues that the 2021 treaty has achieved what it set out to do, which was to steer German players into a safe, legal market. In 2026 the regulator itself began quietly loosening the rules it spent five years defending.

Denmark took the opposite path. When it opened its online market on 1 January 2012, it did so with lean rules, a moderate tax on revenue, and a licence that let operators offer a product players actually wanted. Within a decade, around 90% of Danish online gambling was with licensed operators. Now Denmark is tightening, and the bill on the table, L 37, borrows several ideas straight from the German playbook, including the ban on revenue-share payments to affiliates that Germany introduced in 2021.

This article looks at what Germany did, what the evidence says about the results, and why we think Denmark is about to repeat a mistake that its own success story should have taught it to avoid.

A note on where we stand: Fonvig Group works in performance marketing and digital media in the Nordic region, and our sister company Norden Media Group publishes iGaming media in Denmark and Sweden. We have a direct interest in how these markets are regulated, and the views in this article are ours. The facts come from the legislation, the regulators, the courts and the sources listed at the end. For background on the Nordic picture, see our article on Finland opening its online gambling market.

Germany and Denmark at a glance

Germany Denmark
Online casino licensed since 1 July 2021 1 January 2012
Regulator GGL, a joint authority of the 16 states (operational since 2023) Spillemyndigheden
Tax on online casino 5.3% of every stake 28% of gross gaming revenue (20% until 2021)
Slot stake limit €1 per spin (up to €3 or €5 for vetted players since July 2026) None
Minimum time per spin 5 seconds, no autoplay None
Deposit limit €1,000 per month across all operators, with time-limited exceptions Each player must set their own
Online roulette and blackjack Not under the national licence; left to the individual states Licensed
Revenue share for affiliates Banned since 2021 Allowed; L 37 would ban it from July 2027
Estimated channelisation 77% (regulator study) to under 50% (Handelsblatt Research Institute) 88.5% of online casino and betting (regulator, 2024); under 72% (H2 Gambling Capital)

How Germany got here

Germany spent most of two decades trying not to regulate online casino. The 2008 Interstate Treaty on Gambling, an agreement between the 16 federal states, banned online casino and poker outright and left sports betting with the state lotteries. The ban did not stop Germans from playing. It meant they played with operators licensed in Malta, Gibraltar and elsewhere, who argued that EU law on the freedom to provide services allowed them to.

The states tried to fix this in 2012. The amended treaty promised 20 sports betting licences, but the licensing procedure was challenged in court and never completed. Schleswig-Holstein went its own way the same year, licensing online casino and poker under its own law before rejoining the national treaty. For most of the 2010s, then, the German market was grey: large, mostly offshore, and largely untaxed.

The current treaty, the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag 2021 (GlüStV 2021), took effect on 1 July 2021, with a period of tolerated operation from October 2020 for operators that followed the new rules in advance. For the first time it allowed licences for virtual slot machines, online poker and online sports betting across the whole country. A new joint regulator, the Gemeinsame Glücksspielbehörde der Länder (GGL), based in Halle, took over licensing and enforcement and became fully operational at the start of 2023.

On paper, Germany had joined the club of licensed European markets. In practice, the states that had spent years trying to keep online casino out wrote a licence designed to make it as unappealing as possible.

What the 2021 treaty allows, and what it does not

The rules for virtual slot machines are in section 22a of the treaty, and they go further than in any other major European market:

  • A €1 maximum stake per spin. For comparison, Denmark and Sweden have no stake limit on slots, and the UK introduced a £5 cap for adults in 2025.
  • At least five seconds per game, and no autoplay. A spin may only start after the player confirms it, and only after the previous game has ended.
  • No jackpots.
  • A €1,000 monthly deposit limit across all operators. The limit is enforced through a central system, LUGAS, which also stops a player from playing with two operators at the same time. A player who switches operator has to wait five minutes before playing slots again. Spain will introduce a similar cross-operator limit from March 2027, as we describe in our article on Spain.
  • No online table games under the national licence. Virtual versions of roulette, blackjack and baccarat are expressly banned as slot games. Online casino table games are left to the individual states, which may run them as a monopoly or license a small number of operators. Few have done so, so a player in most of Germany cannot legally play online roulette with a nationally licensed operator.
  • The word "casino" is banned. Licensed operators may not use the terms "casino" or "casino games" when offering or advertising virtual slots. The licensed product has to call itself something else.

The marketing rules are strict as well. Under section 5 of the treaty, there may be no advertising for virtual slots, online poker or online casino games on radio, TV or the internet between 6 am and 9 pm. Betting may not be linked to live sports broadcasts. And section 5(6) states that for gambling that self-excluded players are barred from, no variable payment may be agreed or paid for internet advertising, "in particular in the form of affiliate links", meaning no pay based on turnover, deposits or stakes. In other words, Germany banned revenue-share affiliate deals five years before Denmark proposed the same thing.

Each rule can be explained on its own as a measure against problem gambling. The question is what they do together.

The tax that changed the product

The most consequential rule is not in the treaty at all. From 1 July 2021, Germany taxes virtual slots and online poker at 5.3% of every stake, not of the operator's revenue.

That difference matters because online slots pay most of their stakes back to players. On a game that returns 96% of stakes, the operator keeps 4%. A 5.3% tax on stakes is then larger than everything the operator keeps. At a parliamentary hearing on the tax in 2021, one expert noted that at the payout rates usual in online gambling, 5.3% of stakes amounts to roughly 125% of the operator's revenue. Another analysis put the equivalent tax on gross gaming revenue at around 57%, three times the EU average.

No operator can pay more in tax than it earns, so licensed operators did the only thing they could: they lowered the payout. The Hessian Finance Court, ruling on two challenges to the tax in autumn 2024, accepted that a stake tax of 5.3% amounts to high taxation in practice. According to reporting on those judgments, the return to player on licensed German slots is on average five to six percentage points below the international level.

From a player's point of view, this is the heart of the problem. The same slot game, from the same developer, pays back noticeably less at a licensed German site than at an unlicensed one. Add a €1 stake limit, a five-second spin, no roulette and a deposit cap, and the licensed offer is not only more restricted. It is objectively worse value for money, and players notice.

The court upheld the tax. But in its reasoning it assumed that the black market share for virtual slots was around 80%. Tax receipts tell a similar story: according to federal statistics office figures reported at the time, revenue from the virtual slot tax in December 2024 was 6.6% lower than a year earlier.

How big is the black market?

Measuring an illegal market is hard by definition, and the estimates for Germany are far apart. That gap is itself part of the story.

For years, the GGL said the black market was small. In its estimates, unlicensed German-language gambling sites made up €500 to 600 million a year, which it presented as 3 to 4% of the total legal market, including lotteries and land-based gambling. Measured that way, channelisation looked like 96 to 97%. Against the part of the market that matters here, online slots and sports betting, the same figure is about 25%, which the GGL acknowledged in its 2024 activity report.

At the end of 2025 the GGL published a study it had commissioned from the Blockchain Research Lab, based on a survey of 2,000 online gamblers. It estimated that unlicensed operators earned €547 million in gross gaming revenue in 2024, up 17% from €466 million in 2023, and put channelisation at 77%. Two details from the survey stand out. Players who used only unlicensed sites reported higher stakes and higher losses than those who used only licensed ones. And the GGL itself described the figures as indicative rather than definitive.

Other studies are much more pessimistic. A 2025 study by the Handelsblatt Research Institute, commissioned by Sport1, combined web traffic analysis, tax data and existing studies. It concluded that the black market share across German online gambling is likely above 50%, meaning channelisation below 50%, and that for online casino and virtual slots it is in the range of 70 to 80%. The same study noted that H2 Gambling Capital, whose figures Denmark's regulator also uses, put Germany's channelisation at 36%, against 89% for Denmark and 95% for the UK.

Those who depend on the licensed market and its advertising have an obvious interest in a high figure, and the regulator in a low one. But even the regulator's own study puts almost a quarter of the online market outside the system. And the trend in every source points the same way: the black market is not shrinking.

There is one more figure worth keeping in mind. Germany's licensed online market generated around €3.5 billion in gross gaming revenue in 2025, according to the GGL. Unlicensed operators pay no German tax, are not connected to OASIS, the national self-exclusion register, and do not enforce deposit limits. A self-excluded German player who wants to keep gambling has exactly one option: the black market.

Enforcement: chasing a moving target

Germany has not been passive about the black market. The GGL has built up a broad enforcement toolkit, and some of it has worked:

  • In 2025 it reviewed 2,662 websites run by unlicensed operators or their advertisers. By the end of the year, 1,843 were no longer accessible from Germany, and on 178, payments through common payment providers had been stopped.
  • From September 2024, after pressure from the GGL, Google allowed only licensed operators to buy gambling ads in Germany.
  • The authority increasingly targets the infrastructure around unlicensed operators: payment providers, hosting companies, search engines and social media platforms.

But one important tool failed in court. In March 2025, the Federal Administrative Court ruled that the treaty gave the GGL no legal basis for ordering internet access providers to block unlicensed gambling sites. The states have since agreed an amendment to the treaty to give the regulator that power, using DNS blocking. DNS blocking is easy to get around with a VPN or a different DNS server, as every other country that uses it, Denmark and Norway included, has found. In Norway, blocked casinos still had 72 million visits from Norwegian users, as we describe in our article on Norway's gambling monopoly.

Enforcement is necessary. But it is a race against an opponent who can launch a new domain in an afternoon. The 1,843 blocked sites are a measure of effort, not of success. A licensed market only wins that race if the licensed product gives players a reason to choose it.

The quiet U-turn

The clearest sign that the 2021 model has not worked is that the regulator has started to loosen it.

  • Deposit limits. Under a GGL guideline, operators may let some players deposit more than €1,000 a month: up to €10,000 for players who prove they can afford it with documents such as tax assessments or bank statements, and up to €30,000 for players aged 21 or over, for no more than 1% of an operator's active players. The guideline is time-limited and runs until 31 December 2026.
  • Stake limits. From July 2026, licensed operators approved by the GGL may raise the slot stake limit from €1 to €3 or €5 per spin. The €5 level is only for players who have shown no signs of problem gambling in the past 90 days, and operators must monitor players who move up.

Both changes are cautious and come with conditions. But both concede the industry's main argument: that the original limits were so tight they pushed players towards operators with no limits at all.

The treaty also requires an evaluation. The final report is due by 31 December 2026 and will cover player protection, OASIS, the deposit limit, advertising, LUGAS, enforcement and how online casino should be offered. It is expected to shape the next reform. Several states have already failed to agree on changes to the deposit rules, so the outcome is far from certain.

Germany is also still paying for its grey years. In April 2026 the Court of Justice of the EU held that EU law does not prevent German players from suing unlicensed operators to get their lost stakes back, for contracts concluded under the earlier ban. A related case on sports betting is still pending. Thousands of such claims are working through the German courts, a long and expensive legal tail that comes from a market that existed for years without a working licence.

Denmark 2012: the lean model

Denmark's approach could hardly have been more different. When the Danish Gambling Act opened the market on 1 January 2012, the idea was simple: if Danes were going to gamble online anyway, it was better that they did so with operators that held a Danish licence, paid Danish tax and answered to a Danish regulator.

The licence was built to be taken up:

  • Online casino in full. Slots, roulette, blackjack and poker, including live casino, all under one licence. No stake limits, no minimum spin times.
  • A tax on revenue, not on stakes. 20% of gross gaming revenue, so operators could offer payout rates in line with international competition.
  • Open licensing. Any operator that met the requirements could get a licence. There was no fixed number of licences and no long tender.
  • Ordinary marketing. Licensed operators could advertise on TV, online and in sport, and work with affiliates on the commercial terms they agreed, including revenue share.
  • Player protection built in. Danish licence holders must check every player's identity, connect to ROFUS, the national self-exclusion register, and ask players to set a deposit limit.

It worked. Before liberalisation, just under 40% of Danish online gambling was with operators that would later be licensed. By 2020 the figure was around 90%, and industry analysis put it at 91.5% in 2024, one of the highest rates in Europe. Licensed online casino grew into the largest single part of the Danish gambling market, and Spillemyndigheden earned a reputation as one of Europe's more competent regulators. For a decade, Denmark was the example other countries pointed to when they argued that regulation could work.

Denmark since: the slow tightening

Denmark has not stood still since 2012, and most changes have been reasonable on their own terms:

  • The gambling tax on online casino and betting rose from 20% to 28% in 2021.
  • Bonus rules now limit a welcome bonus to DKK 1,000 and cap wagering requirements at a maximum of 10x on deposit plus bonus.
  • Deposit limits are mandatory, and ROFUS has become more widely used.
  • Spillemyndigheden has received powers to block unlicensed sites and has used them, with the same limits that DNS blocking has everywhere.

None of this is comparable with Germany. A Danish player can still play roulette, still choose their own stake, and still get a payout that is competitive internationally. But each step has narrowed the gap between what a licensed Danish operator can offer and what an unlicensed one can. And Spillemyndigheden's annual report for 2025 no longer included an estimate of the unlicensed market, the one figure that would show whether channelisation is holding.

L 37: Denmark borrows from the German playbook

L 37, tabled in October 2026, implements a broad political agreement from 2025 to reduce gambling problems and protect young people. We covered the bill in detail in our article on Finland's market opening. Put next to the German treaty, the similarities are striking:

L 37 (Denmark, proposed) GlüStV 2021 (Germany, in force)
Revenue share for marketing partners banned; payment may not depend on player turnover, winnings or losses Variable, turnover-, deposit- or stake-based pay for affiliate advertising banned (section 5(6))
Whistle-to-whistle ban on gambling ads around live sports on TV and streaming Betting may not be linked to live sports broadcasts; daytime ban on casino ads on radio, TV and internet
Duty of care: operators must monitor player behaviour and act on signs of problem gambling Early-detection systems and the GGL's "markers of harm" for players with higher limits
Spillemyndigheden may ask internet providers to block sites that channel players to unlicensed gambling GGL blocking orders against access providers, struck down by the courts in 2025, now being restored by treaty amendment

L 37 does not touch stake limits, spin speed or the tax, and Denmark is not about to become Germany. Some of the bill is also hard to argue with. Few will defend gambling ads aimed at children, and fines that match the revenue an unlicensed operator earns in Denmark give the regulator a real tool.

But the direction is the German direction: more restrictions on the licensed market, justified by player protection, with little evidence on how they will affect where players actually go.

Why it makes no sense

Our objection to L 37 is not that Denmark is regulating gambling. It is that the bill tightens the licensed side of the market just as the evidence from Germany, a neighbour with the same players, the same games and the same operators, shows what happens when you do that too far.

The licensed market has to be competitive to be useful. Most Danes who gamble want to do it properly: with a licensed operator, protected by Danish law, with a regulator to complain to and no tax on their winnings. That is a strong offer, and it is why Danish channelisation reached 90%. But it only works if playing properly does not mean accepting a clearly worse deal. Germany shows what happens when it does: players with the highest stakes and the biggest losses, the very group that player protection is meant for, are the first to leave.

The revenue-share ban does not touch the black market. Danish comparison sites and media that work with licensed operators will move to fixed payments per new customer (CPA). That rewards sign-up volume rather than long-term, sustainable players, which is arguably the opposite of what the bill wants. Some publishers will decide the licensed Danish market is no longer worth the cost. And the sites that already promote unlicensed casinos to Danish players, outside Danish law and often outside Denmark, are not affected by the new section 36 at all. Germany has had this rule since 2021. It is hard to find anyone who argues it has helped channelisation. Sweden, which has always allowed revenue share, has around 95% of its betting market licensed, as we show in our article on Sweden's 2019 reregulation.

Advertising bans make the licensed brands invisible, not the unlicensed ones. Unlicensed operators were never on Danish TV. They reach players through social media, streamers, search and word of mouth. Each restriction on licensed marketing leaves more of the attention to those channels.

Denmark is not measuring the thing that matters. If you are going to tighten the licensed market, you have to know whether players are staying in it. Spillemyndigheden's 2025 report dropped its estimate of the unlicensed market, and its own most recent figure, for 2024, put 11.5% of online casino and betting outside the licensed market. H2 Gambling Capital, whose data the regulator also uses, put it above 28%. Germany spent years presenting a channelisation rate of 96 to 97% that almost nobody outside the regulator believed. Denmark should not drift into the same position.

The timing is poor. From 1 July 2027, the same day L 37's marketing rules would take effect, Finland opens its market with a 22% tax, lower than Denmark's 28%. Germany's own regulator is now raising stake and deposit limits it once called essential. Around Denmark, the debate is moving towards making licensed markets more attractive. Denmark is moving the other way, and licensed operators have noticed: Betfair leaves Denmark on 18 November 2026, as we describe in Betfair leaves Denmark.

What Denmark should do instead

None of this means doing nothing. A better version of L 37 would keep the parts that target real harm and drop the parts that mainly weaken the licensed market:

  • Measure channelisation every year, openly, with a published method. Make the effect on the licensed share a formal part of any future evaluation.
  • Regulate affiliate marketing rather than banning revenue share. Hold publishers to the same marketing rules as operators, as L 37 already proposes. That deals with bad marketing directly, without punishing a payment model.
  • Put the enforcement effort where the harm is. Blocking, payment blocking and fines matched to the revenue earned in Denmark should be aimed at unlicensed operators and the sites that promote them to Danish players.
  • Do not raise the tax again. Germany's stake tax shows how quickly a tax can turn a licensed product into a worse one.
  • Keep the product competitive. No stake limits or spin-speed rules, which Denmark has wisely never had.

What this means for affiliates and media companies

For publishers, Germany is a useful preview. Revenue share has been banned there since 2021, and the licensed affiliate market has moved to CPA and fixed fees. Some international publishers concluded that German traffic was not worth the compliance cost and moved their focus elsewhere. Those that stayed built around sports betting, where the licensed product is closer to international standards, and around content that does not depend on casino promotion.

If L 37 passes as tabled, Danish publishers should expect the same shift from 1 July 2027: contracts renegotiated to CPA, direct liability for the marketing they produce, and closer scrutiny from Spillemyndigheden. The best-placed publishers will be those that work only with licensed operators, build useful content that readers come back to, and have more than one commercial model. Our guide to iGaming affiliate programs covers how those models work.

Our view

Germany is the clearest example in Europe of a licensed market designed by people who did not really want one. The 2021 treaty was a political compromise between states that disagreed about whether online casino should exist at all, and the product it allowed reflects that: a licence that is legal, heavily taxed and deliberately unattractive. Five years on, even the regulator's own study puts almost a quarter of the online market outside the system, other estimates put it far higher, and the regulator has started to undo some of its own rules.

Denmark showed in 2012 that a different approach works. A competitive licensed product, a moderate tax on revenue and strong player protection inside the licensed system brought 90% of Danish online gambling into a regulated market. That is the achievement L 37 puts at risk. Germany is not the model to copy. It is the warning, right on Denmark's border, of where this road ends.

Sources

This article is general information about gambling regulation in Germany and Denmark as of November 2026. It is not legal advice. L 37 is a bill and may change before it is adopted.

About the author
Steffen Fonvig — Founder & CEO of Fonvig Group

Steffen Fonvig

Founder & CEO, Fonvig Group

Steffen Fonvig is a Danish-born entrepreneur who founded the company at the age of 22. Based in Oslo, Norway, he leads all operations and strategic decisions across Fonvig Group, which has grown from a web and marketing agency into an international group spanning technology, media and investments.